Was Marcus Aurelius a Good Emperor? Exploring Stoicism, Kindness, and Strength with Donald Robertson

Short answer: capable and unusually restrained by Roman-imperial standards, but not a saint. War, Commodus and deaths under his rule belong in the verdict.
A pair of weathered hands gently cradles a small sparrow in a dark bronze scene.

Short answer: yes by the standards of Roman emperors, with serious caveats.

Marcus Aurelius governed through plague, war and rebellion without turning into the kind of ruler Rome had good reason to fear. Ancient sources praise his work rate, legal care and clemency. But those sources were not neutral, and “good emperor” is a verdict, not a fact. His reign also included brutal frontier war, Christian deaths for which his personal responsibility remains disputed, and the succession of Commodus.

That is the useful Marcus: neither the plaster saint of internet Stoicism nor the failed hypocrite of a backlash video. A powerful man left private evidence of the standards he was trying to meet. His policies show some successes and some grave limits.

Watch my 9-minute conversation with Donald Robertson on why Marcus treated kindness as strength:

Donald Robertson is the author of How to Think Like a Roman Emperor and a biography of Marcus Aurelius. Our conversation focuses on a part of Stoicism that the clenched-jaw version tends to lose: justice, natural affection and the refusal to confuse anger with power.

Was Marcus Aurelius a good emperor?

My verdict is: a conscientious and generally effective emperor by the standards of his office, but not a model we should praise without qualification.

The phrase “Five Good Emperors” makes this sound tidier than it is. It is a later historical label for Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius and Marcus, not a certificate issued by an impartial Roman watchdog. It usually points to relative stability and competent rule before Commodus, not moral innocence.

A fair answer needs at least four tests.

TestEvidence in Marcus's favourThe limit
Governing under pressureplague, war, succession problems and Avidius Cassius's revoltcrisis can explain decisions, but it cannot automatically excuse them
Use of powerlong attention to legal cases, clemency after the revolt, no retaliatory purgeRome remained an autocracy built on conquest and slavery
Personal characterthe Meditations records repeated attempts to restrain anger, vanity and crueltya private notebook records aspirations, not an audited policy record
Legacyrelative administrative stability during his lifeCommodus was made Caesar as a child and co-emperor in 177

The case for Marcus

The near-contemporary senator Cassius Dio describes an emperor who would spend days examining legal cases because he did not want the smallest decision treated carelessly. Dio also reports that Marcus refused to purge the supporters of Avidius Cassius after the general's rebellion in 175.

Marcus had prepared to fight a civil war. Cassius was killed by his own officers before the armies met. According to Dio, Marcus would not look at the severed head and ordered it buried. He then asked the Senate not to execute the conspirators and treated the rebellious provinces leniently. The later Historia Augusta tells a similar story about protecting Cassius's family.

That is meaningful evidence of restraint. It is not proof that Stoicism caused the policy, and both surviving narratives want us to admire the emperor. Ancient praise still needs an author's motive attached to it.

The case against Marcus

The first charge is Commodus. Marcus made his surviving son Caesar at five and co-emperor at sixteen. It is too simple to say he knowingly chose a monster: Commodus was named heir before his adult character was clear, and a biological son changed the political options available. Still, succession is part of an emperor's job. The decision failed catastrophically.

The second charge is war. Marcus spent much of his reign fighting along the Danube. We can acknowledge that Rome faced invasions without turning Roman campaigns into clean defensive heroism. Dio records moments of clemency, but also Marcus's desire at one point to annihilate the Iazyges before events forced a settlement. The philosopher-emperor was still an emperor of a violent expansionary state.

The third is the treatment of Christians. Christians were killed at Lyon in 177 and elsewhere during his reign. Historians dispute whether Marcus ordered a new persecution, approved provincial action or was not directly involved. The evidence does not justify calling him the architect of a central campaign. It also does not justify writing the deaths out because they complicate an attractive story.

There is a wider limit too. Marcus did not abolish imperial autocracy, Roman conquest or slavery. Calling him good must therefore mean comparatively restrained and competent within a bad structure, not good by every standard we should apply now.

What the Meditations can and cannot prove

The Meditations was a private working notebook, not a public manifesto. That makes it unusually candid. It also makes it easy to misuse.

When Marcus tells himself, “Waste no more time arguing about what a good man should be. Be one” (Meditations 10.16), we are seeing the standard he rehearsed. We are not seeing independent proof that he met it.

I find the notebook more useful when I read it as evidence of friction. Marcus repeats himself because he keeps needing the reminder. He writes about anger because he was not naturally beyond anger. He writes about serving other people because power keeps inviting the opposite.

That is much closer to how practice works in my life. I do not need another perfect marble Roman. I need to see what a person does when the same failure keeps returning.

Why kindness is not a soft extra in Stoicism

The internet caricature says a Stoic feels nothing. The ancient position is stranger and more demanding.

Stoics opposed destructive passions built on false judgements. They did not claim that a trained person never startles, flushes, cries or feels the first movement of anger. They also preserved good forms of feeling, including rational joy, goodwill and natural affection.

Marcus uses the idea of philostorgia (fil-oh-STOR-gee-ah): familial or natural affection. The wider Stoic account of affiliation begins with care for oneself and one's family, then asks reason to extend concern towards community and humanity. This social development is the basis of Stoic cosmopolitanism.

That matters because resilience on its own is morally empty. A cruel person can be resilient. A manipulator can be disciplined. Stoic courage and self-command are virtues only when they remain tied to justice.

There is still a serious objection here. Stoics often replace pity and grief about another person's suffering with steady concern and useful action. A critic can reasonably ask whether care that refuses to be wounded loses something human. I do not think the answer is to pretend that tension disappears. The strongest Stoic reply is practical: feeling another person's pain is not the same as helping them, and stable care may last when emotional contagion burns out. But a philosophy of kindness must still let another person's suffering reach us.

Why Marcus called gentleness stronger than anger

The line Donald paraphrases in our conversation has a real ancient source, but it should not be turned into a floating modern quote.

In Meditations 11.18 Marcus gives himself a sequence of reminders for anger. He says that genuine benevolence is hard to defeat, and that mildness and gentleness are more human and therefore more manly than rage. The calm person, he argues, has strength and courage. The angry person has been wounded and surrendered to the wound.

That is not a claim that anger never contains information. It may tell you that a boundary has been crossed or an injustice needs attention. The Stoic question is what happens next. Do you examine the impression and choose a response, or let the first surge write the verdict?

Seneca makes the practical point in On Anger: “The great cure for anger is delay.” Delay is not suppression. It is refusing to give an involuntary movement immediate command of your mouth, hands or phone.

This is the part of Stoicism I lean on most as a father. The promise is not that I stop feeling frustrated with the people closest to me. It is that I get a little better at not handing frustration the steering wheel. I do not always manage it. That is the point of calling it a practice.

A three-step kindness-under-pressure practice

This is my modern implementation of the ancient material, not a lost ritual from Marcus.

1. Name the first movement

Use plain language: “heat in my face,” “urge to humiliate him,” “I want to send the message now.” Do not turn the feeling into a moral identity. An angry movement is present. That does not yet settle what you should do.

2. Test the verdict

Ask three questions:

  1. What do I know happened, before adding motive?
  2. What would justice require if I were not trying to win?
  3. What response would I respect tomorrow?

One breath may be enough for a small irritation. A serious conflict may require a night, advice or a formal process.

3. Choose the kind action, not the pleasing one

Kindness may mean listening, correcting gently or letting something minor go. It may also mean a firm boundary, documenting misconduct, protecting a child, leaving a dangerous situation or asking someone with authority to intervene.

Stoic kindness is not compulsory access to you. Marcus's own formula includes teaching when possible and bearing with people when necessary. It does not require making abuse easier. For decisions shaped by power and responsibility, use the Stoic Role Ethics guide rather than a slogan about staying calm.

For the fuller anger toolkit, read Seneca's Stoic techniques for letting go of anger.

So, was Marcus Aurelius kind?

Sometimes, in ways that mattered. His response to Avidius Cassius is a stronger example than a quote card because it cost him something. He had political reasons for clemency, but moral action does not become unreal merely because it is also intelligent.

He was also capable of harsh war and participated in institutions we should condemn. The emperor did not embody kindness. He repeatedly treated gentleness as a discipline of power, and on some important occasions the record suggests he practised it.

So was Marcus Aurelius a good emperor? Comparatively, yes. Absolutely, no. He was one of Rome's more conscientious rulers, not proof that enlightened autocracy works and not a saint rescued from history.

The part worth testing is smaller: when anger offers you the feeling of strength, can you keep enough command to choose justice instead?

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 8.59: “Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then, or bear with them.”

Common questions

Why was Marcus Aurelius called one of the Five Good Emperors?

The label groups five rulers associated with relative stability and competent government from Nerva to Marcus. It is useful historical shorthand, not an objective moral ranking, and it can conceal the violence of Roman imperial rule.

Why did Marcus Aurelius choose Commodus?

Commodus was Marcus's biological son and was made Caesar at five, before his adult character could be known. Marcus later made him co-emperor. Political constraints make the choice understandable. They do not make its consequences less disastrous.

Did Marcus Aurelius persecute Christians?

Christians were persecuted and killed during his reign, including at Lyon in 177. Scholars dispute Marcus's personal responsibility and there is no secure evidence that he launched a new empire-wide persecution. The careful answer is neither conviction nor acquittal.

Did Stoics believe in suppressing emotion?

No. They tried to correct destructive passions and the judgements that sustain them, while recognising involuntary first reactions and good forms of feeling. That is not the same as bottling emotion, although critics can still question whether the Stoic ideal leaves enough room for vulnerable compassion.

Source and research note

I checked this article against Cassius Dio's account of Marcus's reign and the Cassius revolt, the later Historia Augusta* life of Marcus, Meditations* 11.18, the scholarly debate over Marcus and Christian persecution, and the exact transcript of my conversation with Donald Robertson.

The Stoic claims were also checked against The Stoic Codex, my working research system, including its records on Marcus Aurelius, the therapy of anger, natural affection, Stoic affiliation and the serious “Stoicism is cold” objection. The Codex distinction that matters most here is simple: Stoic freedom from destructive passion is not absence of feeling, and Stoic kindness remains answerable to justice.